

**Barack Obama and the 2008 Presidential Election: Applying the Minimal Racial Cue
Model to a Maximal Racial Cue Situation**

Gregory A. Petrow and Joel Hebrink

University of Nebraska Omaha

Department of Political Science

For presentation at the April 2010 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. We express deep thanks to John H. Aldrich at Duke University for making the Cooperative Congressional Election Study data available to us.

The United States elected Barack Obama as its president in 2008, marking a historic racial achievement for blacks in the U.S. This remarkable accomplishment suggests that the U.S. is moving toward the American racial ideal – the color blind society, in which racial differences are white-washed. However, scholarly evidence indicates that the American white majority is anything but color-blind. Economists find pervasive racial differences in how whites treat blacks (e.g. Munnell et al. 1996, Yinger 1995, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003, Ayers 1995). Psychologists do too (e.g. Chaiken and Bargh 1993, Fazio and Dunton 1997). In contrast, political scientists are more divided on the role of race. While the evidence is strong that racial attitudes and feelings are a powerful force driving whites' policy preferences (e.g. Kinder and Sanders 1996), the evidence that whites are reluctant to vote for black political candidates is mixed – some find black candidates lose white votes due to their race (Bullock and Dunn 1999, Gay 1997, Reeves 1997, Terkildsen 1993), and other do not (Highton 2004, Bullock 2000, Voss and Lublin 2001, Citrin, Green and Sears 1990).

This confusion stems in no small part from that fact that most black elected officials are elected from areas of mostly black voters, or where black voters are a plurality. Conversely, black candidates for state-level offices, where whites comprise the majority of electorates, are very rare. Thus, the 2008 presidential election provides race scholars an important opportunity to study how a black candidate affects the candidate evaluations of a majority white electorate. Studies of this election, then, may bring a lot of clarity to the study of race and voting.

We present a model of candidate evaluation in an election in which one of the two major party candidates is black. We include a cadre of variables that have proven to matter for how voters decide who to support in presidential elections. However, because of the racial nature of this election, we also include a variety of racial factors that theory suggests should matter for

how whites evaluate an election with a black candidate. We focus only on whites because they are the racial majority, and thus their voting decisions hold the greatest sway over the election outcome.

Black candidates can lead whites to racialized thinking. Racialized thinking is when people's racial attitudes and affects become salient, influencing their thoughts and actions. In a campaign with two white major party candidates devoid of any racial issues (implicit or explicit), racial attitudes and affects are not salient to whites. However, we argue that a black candidate, by virtue of skin tone alone, changes this. In previous work we termed this the *minimal racial cueing model of political processing*, in the belief that the color of a black candidate's skin is all that is necessary to cue racialized thinking in whites (Petrow forthcoming).¹ In that paper we argued that the color of a racial minority's skin will serve as the strongest cue in low-stimulus elections because white voters will lack other information with which to disconfirm racial stereotypes, or in other ways mitigate the power of racial feelings and beliefs. In this paper we investigate the power of racial cueing in the highest stimulus election in American politics, and we find that the power of the racial cue in this context, as well, can hardly be stronger. In this context, the "minimal" of the minimal racial cue has new meaning -- it predicts, all that is

¹ This is racial cueing in a manner different from how scholars traditionally consider it. Most scholars study racial cueing as involving racial messages, be they implicit or explicit, to cue racial thinking among whites (e.g. Mendelberg 2001). This presents racial cueing as a choice made by political actors to manipulate the electorate, be it for an election outcome or for some other reason. My argument is much broader – that black candidates are inherent racial cues themselves, triggering such thinking among whites.

required to trigger racialized thinking in whites is a racial minority candidate. We now proceed to present the racial cueing model of vote choice.

THEORY

Automatic Racial Cueing and Categorization

People perceive race automatically, unconsciously categorizing others accordingly (Spielman et al. 1988, Greenwald et al. 2002). People then process information about those they perceive, in-line with their relevant racial stereotypes, feelings and cognitions (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2000). Most whites demonstrate an automatic and unconscious preference for whites over blacks, and scholars demonstrate that this is not simply a function of whites' greater familiarity with members of their own race (Dasgupta et al. 2000). Apparently, it is a function of whites' negative black stereotypes, white identities and negative black affect, that are automatically cued (Greenwald et al. 2002).

The work of Lodge and Taber (2000) applies these results to the political world. They explain how people's candidate evaluations are fundamentally and inescapably shaped by their feelings. People's group affects are cued automatically, they store this affect permanently in their on-line tally, and they rely on their "likeability heuristic" to use these group feelings to make quick decisions. From this view, mass politics reduces to people's automatic reactions to groups because voters use decision heuristics to reach conclusions, rather than processing information thoughtfully. While many whites do harbor conscious anti-black affect and stereotypes, others do not (e.g. Virtanen and Huddy 1998). The same holds unconsciously, with some whites even holding positive associations (Fazio and Dunton 1997). And for some of those whites who do harbor automatic negative feelings, they consciously suppress those feelings because they strive to be racially egalitarian (Devine 1989, Dunton and Fazio 1997).

When this cueing occurs in the political environment, it may be dependent on aspects of the political environment. In earlier work we surmised that low stimulus elections lead to greater racial cueing than high stimulus ones (Petrow forthcoming). One line of scholarship relevant to high- versus low-stimulus elections comes from the stereotyping literature in social psychology. People can process person-related information heuristically, relying on stereotypes to guide their thoughts and behaviors; or, in a piecemeal integration fashion, discounting stereotypes and instead learning about people on a trait-by-trait basis. Our earlier belief was that high stimulus elections should expose voters to more information that they would use to disconfirm stereotypes.

This expectation has two flaws, however. First, the stereotyping research is based on interpersonal interactions in which cognitive processors have much more personal evidence about other people. In addition, long-lasting interdependent personal relationships lead to piecemeal intergration. In a political campaign, the amount of information pales in comparison, and no interdependent relationship exists. Second, in politics the vast majority of voters are motivated reasoners (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2000). People process information to confirm their biases.² This suggests then that the minimal cue model should serve in *all* types of elections with black candidates because the racial group of the candidate alone should serve to racialize

² Remarkably, social psychologists have even found that Obama supporters perceived his skin to be of a lighter tone, while Obama opponents perceived a darker skin tone (Caruso, Mead and Balcetis 2009).

thinking – the amount of information in the election, and the level of stimulus, should not matter.³

The second part of the minimal racial cueing model is the component that comes after the cue – the sentiments and feelings that come to mind after the triggering. While the notion of cueing itself is not controversial, there is quite a bit of disagreement concerning what exactly is cued. In other words, given the cueing, what are the racial notions that then become salient to whites? Importantly, one should consider the notions that might lead whites to *support* black candidates, as well as oppose them.

White Racial Prejudice Factors

The work of Henri Tajfel (1982), and Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner (Tajfel and Turner 1986) demonstrates that group identities should hold a place in the center stage of group behavior. A core prediction of social identity theory (SIT) is that, “social categorization per se ... is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group.” (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 38). SIT predicts that group identifiers should have positive feelings for their in-group, as well as negative feelings for out-groups (e.g. Tajfel 1982). In other words, triggering racial identity should bring to mind racial affect, which is widely considered one of the most powerful predictors of behavior and attitudes (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2000, Glaser and Salovey 1998, Clore and Tamir 2002). Racial affect is stored with the group schemas, so when whites’ out-group schema is cued, the affect toward the out-group becomes salient, too (Fiske and Pavelchak 1985).

³ Other aspects of the political environment could matter for the degree of racialized thinking. For example, campaigns with more racialized messages should increase *how* racialized voters’ processing is, even with a black major party candidate.

The relevant identity for white voters would be *white identity*. The consensus among scholars of white racial identity is that for whites their racial identity is “hidden” (Doane 2005). Because whites are the racial majority, most take their racial group for granted, considering it as “normal” and identifying being white with also being “American.” Consequentially, the identity is neither well-formed, nor salient, for most whites. This is exacerbated by the strong racial segregation in American society, leading most whites to only have daily experiences with whites. Survey results confirm that most whites do not rank their racial identities as being important to their sense of self (Jaret and Reitzes 1999).

However, this doesn’t mean that white racial identity is powerless as a psychological construct. A substantial plurality of whites rate their racial identity as having important meaning to them (Croll 2007). In addition, psychologists find that for some whites, a salient racial identity evokes prejudice (Croll 2007, Arriola and Cole 2001, Rowe, Bennett and Atkinson 1994, Pope-Davis and Ottavi 1994, Helms 1990).⁴ Prejudiced whites tend to feel that their group is engaged in a struggle against other races, especially blacks. Psychologists document that the

⁴ Regarding white identity, the political psychologists Cara Wong and Grace E. Cho (2005) find the effects of white identity to be limited. They acknowledge many whites do “feel close” to whites, and this identity increases: positive feelings for whites, positive white stereotypical evaluations, negative black stereotypical evaluations, and symbolic racism. However, the magnitudes of the effects are small. In addition, the authors consider the determinants of four race-related policy preferences measured in the American National Election Study from 1972 to 2000, finding effects for white identity in some years but not others. However, I note that this “feel close to” measure of racial identity was dichotomous, and did not measure the *strength* of racial identity – a crucial factor in capturing the effects of identity (Huddy 2001).

presence of out-group members in social interactions is the classic cause of this differentiation that makes the group-related thoughts and feelings salient, but political scientists have long considered that political candidates and elected officials have the same effect (e.g. Gay 2001, Bobo and Gilliam 1990).

Triggering the identity brings whites' positive social status to mind. Evidence that some whites value their racial group's position in society is that whites have a cohesive political interest they strive to maintain (Lowery et al. 2006). In other words, prejudiced whites resist policies promoting racial equality because they have a sense that such policies threaten the collective interests of whites. Some whites evidently oppose affirmative action on the grounds it decreases the likelihood whites will get jobs or education they otherwise would have had (Kinder and Sanders 1996). White identity serves as the link between the threat of whites losing employment opportunities to affirmative action and opposition to the policy (Lowery et al. 2006).

Racial affect should be a central motivator as well. Indeed, this is the definition of prejudice typically used by social psychologists – negative affect toward the out-group (e.g. Fiske 1998). Prejudiced whites should feel *anger toward blacks*. Psychologists find that anger at members of out-groups is caused when members of dominant groups feel that subordinate groups are challenging their standing, or status (Mackie, Devos and Smith 2000). This anger leads people to want to strike against the subordinate group. Prejudiced whites will tend to feel group threat from blacks, and because electing the first black president represents an important racial achievement, this should cause anger. Although the triggering of white identity is important in this model of voting participation, it is the prejudice linked to that identity that

should most strongly affect the vote choice because it will engender the desire to strike against the subordinate out-group.

A variety of scholars study the link between affect and action. All of these scholars conclude that dislike for a group, the kind of dislike that prejudiced whites feel toward blacks, can make people take action. In political science, the most notable of these authors are George Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000). Marcus and his co-authors group all affects into three classes – enthusiasm, anxiety and aversion – and find each type is related to different types of behaviors. Aversion is the intense dislike people feel for a person or group with which they are familiar. Marcus and his colleagues find that aversion causes people to act against those they feel the aversion towards. A black candidate should cue anger (what Marcus calls aversion) in prejudiced whites, leading to an action that leads whites to act against blacks -- which would end up as a vote against Barack Obama.

What this work suggests is that negative affect toward an out-group – prejudiced whites' anger toward blacks – should motivate action against them. However, other researchers explore how the positive in-group affect might actually be a more important factor for motivating action against the out-group. These researchers find that prejudice is typically more a matter of in-group favoritism than out-group derogation (Lowery et al. 2006). This manifests itself as positive in-group affect (Brewer 1999). Given this perspective, what typically motivates discriminatory behavior is the desire to benefit one's group.

The most relevant in-group affect for whites should be the pride of being white (*white pride*). Scholars of white supremacist movements find white pride to be a major feeling of movement participants (e.g. Swain 2002). Group pride is felt when someone's group does something they approve of (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988). However, group pride can only be

felt when people feel a sense of identity with the group. Group identification with whites is associated with prejudice. Thus, prejudiced white should feel the most pride at being white, and the kinds of achievements that cause the feeling might include denigration of non-whites.

The most important factor related to anti-black actions and beliefs in political science is *racial resentment*. Of all the racial cognitions, racial resentment is among the most studied in political science and found to be a powerful predictor of racially conservative policy preferences (e.g. Kinder and Sanders 1996). Racial resentment is a more recent incarnation of symbolic racism – the idea that blacks violate societal norms (through their perceived laziness and taking of social welfare benefits). Whites embrace these beliefs widely, leading to opposition to social welfare programs, affirmative action, and busing (e.g. Sears 1988).

Might these attitudes be cued by a black candidate, stimulating racially-motivated political participation? Perhaps when whites encounter black candidates they are reminded of their negative beliefs and they act on them. There is evidence to support this from other studies. Kinder and Sanders (1996) find that racial resentment predicted the vote for Bush over Dukakis in 1988, and Jackman (2008) finds that racial resentment predicted the vote for Hillary Clinton against Barack Obama in the 2008 Democratic primary. A black candidate might cue these negative cognitions of racial resentment (which in many ways are simply negative stereotypes; Virtanen and Huddy 1998), and the beliefs might motivate whites to vote against a black candidate on Election Day because they want to punish blacks for violating social norms, or to ensure that policies won't be introduced to assist a group they view as undeserving.

A second has to do with *black racial group interest* – the notion that a black candidate will govern in the interest of blacks. This can mean many things, but the most political expression of it would be the concern that Obama, because he is black, will use the power of the

federal government to help blacks. In other words, some whites may feel concerned, or threatened, by the idea that Obama will use the powers of the president to benefit blacks. In a two candidate election, this would be a comparative evaluation, relative to the opponent.

White Race Liberal Factors

The factors of white race liberalism are poorly developed in psychology and political science, compared to the factors of white prejudice. The consequence for this study is that these concepts are theoretically and empirically under-explored.

Surely, however, the opposite of racial resentment should predict support for Obama. We term the flip of racial resentment, *racial acceptance*. White race liberals reject the beliefs of racial resentment because of a political consciousness that rejects racism. It may be the case that when such voters encounter black candidates they are reminded that they reject such beliefs – indeed, the candidate might embody the rejection of such beliefs as one who has risen to the level to run for Congress. Cuddy, Glick and Fiske (2007) find that what leads people to have positive attitudes toward out-groups is a combination of warm feelings and beliefs that the group is competent. On this latter point, racial resentment strikes against the heart of black group competence, as it is the belief that blacks don't work hard enough and receive too much welfare. Thus, a rejection of these beliefs, racial acceptance, would involve viewing blacks as “competent.”

What feelings might be the components of white race liberalism? In other words, what feelings would motivate whites to take positive action to assist blacks in advancing their political goals? Engaging in such an act can be considered a “facilitation action,” which is an action of association with an out-group that leads to group-helping (Cuddy, Glick and Fiske 2007). Such actions are the result of positive feeling (“warmth”), coupled with belief in the group's

competence (Cuddy, Glick and Fiske 2007). In the case of whites' feelings toward blacks, this positive feeling could be *black pride*. A black candidate for president might evoke this feeling among white race liberals as a reminder of the long struggle blacks have been engaged in, a pride felt at the accomplishments along the way.

What other race-referencing affects might lead whites to support black candidates? Of course, whites' feelings for their own racial group should be relevant as well. Perhaps whites' anger at their own race might play a role.⁵ Little is known about how whites' negative feelings for their own group might influence their attitudes and behaviors. However, given that affect is one of the most important determinants of people's policy preferences and attitudes, whites who feel angry at whites may be more supportive of the historical white out-group.

Finally, we began this discussion of the racial factors with white identity. However, might white race liberals reject notions of whiteness? The strongest manifestation of this would be professing a closeness, or allegiance, to blacks, instead of whites. We expect this to predict support for Obama as well. We call this *racial solidarity*.

Current Scholarship on Race and the 2008 Presidential Election

Even though the 2008 election is a recent occurrence, scores of scholars have already published or written papers about the outcome. Almost all of these find that racial prejudice reduced support for Barack Obama on Election Day. Most studies analyze the role of racial resentment (Clarke et al. 2009, Pasek et al. 2009, Lewis-Beck, Tien and Nadeau 2010). Some consider the role that implicit attitudes played in the outcome (Pasek et al. 2009, Payne et al.

⁵ In retrospect, white guilt might have also been appropriate (e.g. Iyer, Leach and Crosby 2003, Harth, Kessler and Leach 2008, Miron, Branscombe and Schmitt 2006, Leach, Iyer and Pedersen 2006, and Powell, Branscombe and Schmitt 2005).

2009). Others analyze negative black affect (Barretto and Segura 2008). Still others consider other racial factors, like racial stereotypes (Hutchings 2009, Bafumi and Herron 2009, Tien and Nadeau 2010, Piston 2010). The few studies that perform aggregate-level analyses tend to find a small or nonexistent role for racial prejudice (Bullock 2009, Mas and Moretti 2009). We are undoubtedly missing other studies for this list, but we are confident that the general pattern of findings still holds that racial factors cost Obama some of the white vote in 2008.

METHODS AND RESULTS

We analyze random sample survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The CCES went into the field before the presidential election (October 8 to November 3) and then again after (November 5 to December 1). This was an Internet-based survey conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix. The company maintains a panel of people who have been recruited to participate in on-line surveys. They begin with a target random sample of the adult population based on the 2006 American Community Survey. For each member of this target sample, YouGov/Polimetrix recruits members from their opt-in sample that match that person on a number of characteristics, including gender, age, race, region, education, news interest, marital status, party identification, ideology, religious affiliation, church attendance, income, and registration status. Analysts then weight the sample using propensity scores to assure that the sample is nationally representative. The total sample size is 1,000 adult American citizens, of which 760 were white, with 576 whites reporting that they voted in the election. The with-in panel response rate (RR3) for the study was 47.1%.⁶ The question wording for the racial items is included in the Appendix.

⁶ Other sampling information is posted at <http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/index.html>.

We estimated a logistic regression in which voting for Barack Obama is coded as 1, and voting for any other candidate in the election was 0. We show the results in Table 1.⁷

[Table 1 about here]

We begin with the results for white race prejudice factors.⁸ We see that white identity, black anger and black racial group interest all decreased whites' propensity to vote for Obama ($p < .10$, two-tailed test). These coefficients are not intuitively interpretable because they are in non-linear units. As such, we convert the coefficients into changes in the predicted probability of voting for Obama. We turn to Figure 1 for black racial group interest.

[Figure 1 about here]

This is the difference in two scales, indicating the degree to which whites thought Barack Obama would use the government to help blacks, minus the same for John McCain. Higher values indicate a greater score on thinking Obama was likely to do so, compared to McCain (i.e. coded so higher values indicate whites thinking Obama was more likely than McCain to use government to help blacks). The predicted probability of voting for Obama among whites who thought Obama and McCain were equally likely to use the government to help blacks was .62, which decreased to .04 among those who saw Obama as maximally likely to use government to

⁷ These results do not include the dummy variable for South as a control. Adding the variable produces no differences in the results.

⁸ In an effort to provide a baseline with which to compare these results to, we re-ran this model for Congressional elections in which the major party candidates were white, and the current member of congress was white as well. Unlike the results we report here for the Presidential vote, the racial factors in those congressional elections failed to produce any statistically significant change in voting.

help blacks. The total decrease in the predicted probability of voting for Obama given this factor was .58 ($p < .05$). On the figure we also show the proportion of the white sample that voted in each of the statistically significant categories. One can see in this figure that about half of all whites who voted were in the statistically significant categories of this variable.

In Figure 2 we report the result for white identity. The predicted probability of voting for Obama ranges from .42 among those who felt equally as close to whites and blacks (Obama won about .45 of all white votes in the sample), to .09 among those who felt as distant from blacks and as close to whites as the measure allowed. The total decrease in the predicted probability of voting for Obama is .33 (statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level).

[Figure 2 about here]

In Figure 3 we report the results for whites' anger toward blacks. Anger toward blacks is a four-category measure, with the lowest two categories coded as zero. The predicted probability of voting for Obama is .49 among whites feeling the least anger, to .06 among whites feeling the most. The total decrease in the predicted probability of voting for Obama given anger toward blacks is .43 ($p < .05$).

[Figure 3 about here]

We weighted these decreases in the predicted probability of voting for Obama by the proportion of whites distributed across these measures who also voted in the election, to generate an estimate of how much of the vote Obama lost because of these factors. However, because the sample contains only about 450 cases, the variance of the estimates of the changes in the predicted probabilities is quite high. White identity decreased the white vote for Obama by 5.8% (a 95% confidence interval puts the values between -1.5% and -10%). Anger toward blacks decreased the white vote for Obama by 13.2% (-4.3% to -22.3%). Finally, black group interest

decreased the white vote by 26.8% (-5.2% to -49.3%). Our total estimate is that these factors of white prejudice cost Obama 45.8% of the vote, with a 95% confidence interval placing the true value in the population between -11% and -81.7% of the vote.

We turn now to the white race liberal factors. We can see in Table 1 that two such factors increased whites' propensity to vote for Obama – white pride, and racial acceptance. In addition, two other factors increased voting for Obama as well. The first is racial solidarity – the inverse of the white identity scale (whites who feel a stronger identity with blacks than whites). The second is for the white race liberal direction of the black interest group scale – meaning that as whites thought that McCain was more likely to use the government to help blacks than Obama, they were more likely to vote for Obama. We report the first result for white pride in Figure 4.

Finding white pride as a white race liberal factor is quite a surprise given our strong expectation that the factor served as a white prejudice factor. These positive results, however, are robust and strong, remaining consistent in the face of all kinds of different model specifications. We surmise that whites who voted for Obama felt racial pride at doing so. This transformed the meaning of the pride for these whites into a white race liberal factor. On Election Day, the clear expectation was that Obama would win, and so whites who felt proud of their race electing the first black president were more likely to vote for Obama. We report the result for white pride in Figure 4.

[Figure 4 about here]

Those who felt the lowest level of white pride had a predicted probability of voting for Obama of .16. The highest level was .82, with an increase of .63 ($p < .05$). The result for racial acceptance is shown in Figure 5.

[Figure 5 about here]

Racial acceptance increased the predicted probability of voting for Obama also – from .29 among those not in the lowest 20% of racial resentment, to .97 among those with the lowest score of racial resentment. The increase in the predicted probability of voting is .68.

The result for the reverse of the black racial interest scale is shown in Figure 6. Higher values indicate whites who thought McCain would be more likely to use the government to help blacks than Obama. The predicted probability of voting for Obama increases from about .60 to about .99.

[Figure 6 about here]

The final result is for the effect of racial solidarity on voting for Obama. Racial solidarity is whites who identify more strongly with blacks than whites. This result is in Figure 7.

[Figure 7 about here]

Among those who identified equally with whites and blacks, their predicted probability of voting for Obama was .42, which rose to .72 among those who identified strongest with blacks, relative to whites. This is an increase of .30 of the predicted probability.

As before, we weighted these changes in the predicted probability by the proportion of whites who voted in the election that were in the various categories of the variables. White pride increased the vote for Obama by 17%, with the 95% confidence interval ranging from 6.2% to 27.4%. Racial acceptance increased the vote for Obama by 2.5% (with the confidence interval between 0.9% and 5.1%). Believing McCain would use the government to help blacks more than Obama increased Obama's share of the vote by 1.4%. Racial solidarity increased the vote for Obama by 0.4 % (between .01% and 0.8%).

My total estimate is that these factors of white race liberalism added to Obama's vote by 21.3%, with a 95% confidence interval placing the true value in the population between 7.7% and 35.2% of the vote. Adding the prejudice and white race liberal factors together reveals an estimate that Obama lost 25.4% of the white vote due to racial factors, with the 95% confidence interval between -3.4% and -46.5% of the white vote.

CONCLUSION

We begin by highlighting a surprising finding – that racial resentment does not share a statistically significant relationship with voting for Obama in 2008. Based on past findings, we expected to find a powerful relationship. We consider some reasons for our different findings. First, unlike other studies of 2008, we include white identity as a variable, and in our data the two variables correlate at .14. Given the modest size of the correlation, this cannot account for our result. However, racial resentment is strongly correlated with both party identification (-.51) and the party feeling thermometer difference (-.56). While scholars commonly include party identification in models, they do not commonly include party affect. Including both appears to dramatically reduce the power of racial resentment in the analysis. We believe that including both is appropriate because party identification and party affect are distinct, although related, concepts, and we can imagine that they might act as both confounds, and mediators, of the relationship between racial resentment and voting for Obama. We computed a variance inflation factor statistic to test for multicollinearity, and the model we report here passed easily, and so high inter-correlations are not to blame.

Turning to the results in general, white identity has received short shrift in the political behavior literature. This is the first work to include it as a major factor of white racism. We find, in fact, that it operates as a white race prejudice factor, and that the rejection of white identity serves as a white race liberalism factor. The results provide strong support for the notion

that Barack Obama lost some white votes due to racial prejudice. The point estimate itself of about 25% seems very high. However, we remind readers that this is based on data of about 450 cases, and so the variance of these estimates is large. We are 95% confident that on Election Day, the net effect of racial factors among whites cost Obama between 3% and 47% of the white vote. Given the historical patterns of white voters voting for Democratic nominees for president, we find it more plausible that Barack Obama lost between 3% and 15% of the white vote on Election Day due to the net effect of racial factors. This would have cost him between 2.3 and 11.4 percent of the total vote.

WORKS CITED

- Arriola, Kimberly R. Jacob and Elizabeth R. Cole. 2001. "Framing the Affirmative-Action Debate: Attitudes toward the Out-Group Members and White Identity," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 31(12): 2462-2483.
- Ayres, Ian. 1995. "Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of its Cause," *Michigan Law Review*, 94:109-47.
- Bafumi and Michael Herron. 2009. "Prejudice, Black Threat, and the Racist Voter in the 2008 Presidential Election." *Journal of Political Marketing* 8 (4): 334-348.
- Barretto, Matt A. and Gary M. Segura. 2008. "Estimating the Effects of Traditional Predictors, Group Specific Forces, and Anti-Black Affect on 2008 Presidential Vote among Latinos and Non-Hispanic Whites." Presented at the Ohio State University Conference on the 2008 Election, October.
- Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2003. "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination." Unpublished Manuscript, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.

- Bobo, Lawrence, and Gilliam, Franklin D. Jr. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment," *American Political Science Review* 84(2):377-93.
- Brewer, Marilyn B. 1999. "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?" *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3): 429-44.
- Bullock, Charles S. III. 2000. "Partisan Changes in the Southern Congressional Delegation and their Consequences," in David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, and Morris Fiorina (eds.), *Continuity and Change in House Elections*, pp. 39-64, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bullock, Charles S. III. 2009. "Barack Obama and the South." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Politics Group, St. Anne's College and the Rothermere American Institute, Oxford, England, January.
- Bullock, Charles S. III, and Richard E. Dunn. 1999. "The Demise of Racial Redistricting and the Future of Black Representation." *Emory Law Journal* 48: 1209-53.
- Caruso, Eugene M., Nicole L. Mead and Emily Balcetis. 2009. "Political Partisanship Influences Perception of Candidates' Skin Tone." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 106 (November): 20168-20173.
- Chaiken, Shelly and John A. Bargh. 1993. "Occurrence Versus Moderation of the Automatic Attitude Activation Effect: Reply to Fazio," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64(5): 759-765.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald Phillip Green and David O. Sears. 1990. "White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?" *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 1(Spring): 74-96.

- Clarke, Harold D., Allan Kornberg, Thomas J. Scotto, Jason Reifler, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley. 2009. "Yes We Can! Politics and Electoral Choice in America, 2008." Typescript.
- Clore, Gerald R. and Maya Tamir. 2002. "Affect as Embodied Information." *Psychological Inquiry* 13(1): 37-45.
- Croll, Paul R. 2007 "Modeling Determinants of White Racial Identity: Results from a New National Survey." *Social Forces* 2 (December): 613-42.
- Cuddy, Amy C. J., Glick, Peter and Susan T. Fiske. 2007. "The BIAS Map: Behaviors from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92(4): 631-48.
- Dasgupta, Nilanjana, Debbie E. McGhee, Anthony G. Greenwald, and Mahzarin Banaji. 2000. "Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36: 316-28.
- Devine, Patricia. 1989. "Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56(1): 5-18.
- Doane, Ashley W. 2005. "Dominant Group Ethnic Identity in the United States." *Sociological Quarterly* 38(3): 375-97.
- Dunton, Bridget C., and Russell H. Fazio. 1997. "An Individual Difference Measure of Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 23(3): 316-26.
- Fazio, Russell H. and Bridget C. Dunton. 1997. "Categorization by Race: The Impact of Automatic and Controlled Components of Racial Prejudice," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33: 451-70.

- Fiske, Susan. 1998. "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology, volume II*, McGraw-Hill, 357-411.
- Fiske, Susan, and Mark A. Pavelchak. 1985. "Category-Based versus Piecemeal-Based Affective Responses: Developments in Schema-Triggered Affect." in *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior*, eds. R.M. Sorrentino and E.T. Higgins, New York: Guilford.
- Gay, Claudine. 2001. "The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation," *American Political Science Review* 95(3):589-602.
- Gay, Claudine. 1997. *Taking Charge: Black Electoral Success and the Redefinition of American Politics*. Ph.D. diss. Department of Political Science. Harvard University.
- Glaser, Jack and Peter Salovey. 1998. "Affect in Electoral Politics." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 2(3): 156-72.
- Greenwald, Anthony G., Rudman, Laurie A., Nosek, Brian A., Banaji, Mahzarin, Farnham, Shelly D., and Deborah S. Mellott. 2002. "A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept." *Psychological Review*, 109(1): 3-25.
- Harth, Nicole Syringa, Thomas Kessler and Colin Wayne Leach. 2008. "Advantaged Group's Emotional Reactions to Intergroup Inequality: The Dynamics of Pride, Guilt and Sympathy." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 34 (January): 115-29.
- Helms, John E. 1990. *Black and White Racial Identity Attitudes: Theory, Research and Practice*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Highton, Benjamin. 2004. "White Voters and African American Candidates for Congress." *Political Behavior* 26(March): 1-25.

- Huddy, Leonie. 2001. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Political Psychology* 22 (March): 127-56.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. 2009. "Change or More of the Same? Evaluating Racial Attitudes in the Obama Era." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73 (5): 917-42.
- Iyer, A., C.W. Leach and F.J. Crosby. 2003. "White Guilt and Racial Compensation: The Benefits and Limits of Self-Focus." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29: 117-129.
- Jackman, Simon. 2008. "Obama-Clinton and Racial Resentment." May 25.
<http://jackman.stanford.edu/blog/?p=744> (December 8, 2008)
- Jaret, Charles and Donald C. Reitzes. 1999. "The Importance of Racial-Ethnic Identity and Social Setting for Blacks, Whites and Multiracials." *Sociological Perspectives* 42 (4): 711-37.
- Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Leach, Colin Wayne, Aarti Iyer and Anne Pedersen. 2006. "Anger and Guilt about Ingroup Advantage Explain the Willingness for Political Action." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 9 (September): 1232-45.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Charles Tien and Richard Nadeau. 2010. "Obama's Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost?" *PS* January: 69-76.
- Lodge, Milton and Charles S. Taber. 2000. "Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Reasoning," in *Elements of Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of Political Rationality*, eds. Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, London: Cambridge University Press.

- Lowery, Brian S., Unzueta, Miguel M., Knowles, Eric D., and Philip Atiba Goff. 2006. "Concern for the In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90(6): 961-74.
- Mackie, Diane M., Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith. 2000. "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79(4): 602-616.
- Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Mas, Alexandre and Enrico Moretti. 2009. "Racial Bias in the 2008 Presidential Election." *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings* 99(2): 323-29.
- Miron, Anca A., Nyla R. Branscombe and Michael T. Schmitt. 2006. "Collective Guilt as Distress over Illegitimate Intergroup Inequality." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 9(2): 163-80.
- Munnell, Alicia, Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne, and James McEneaney. 1996. "Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data," *American Economic Review*, 86(1): 25-53.
- Ortony, Andrew, Gerald C. Clore and Allan Collins. 1988. *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pasek, Josh, Alexander Tahk, Yphtach Lelkes, Jon A. Krosnick, B. Keith Payne, Omair Akhtar, and Trevor Tompson. 2009. "Determinants of Turnout and Candidate Choice in the 2008 Presidential Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73(5): 943-994.

- Payne, B. Keith, Jon A. Krosnick, Josh Pasek, Yphtach Lelkes, Omair Akhtar, and Trevor Tompson. 2009. "Implicit and Explicit Prejudice in the 2008 American Presidential Election." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 1-8.
- Petrow, Gregory A. Forthcoming. "The Minimal Cue Hypothesis: How Black Candidates Cue Race to Increase White Voting Participation." *Political Psychology*.
- Piston, Spencer. 2010. "How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election." Typescript.
- Pope-Davis, Donald B. and Thomas M. Ottavi. 1994. "The Relationship Between Racism and Racial Identity Among White Americans: A Replication and Extension," *Journal of Counseling and Development*, 72: 293-97.
- Powell, Adam A., Nyla R. Branscombe and Michael T. Schmitt. 2005. "Inequality as Ingroup Privilege or Outgroup Advantage: The Impact of Group Focus on Collective Guilt and Interracial Attitudes." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 4 (April): 508-21.
- Reeves, Keith. 1997. *Voting Hopes or Voting Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates, and Racial Politics in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rowe, Wayne, Sandra K. Bennett, and Donald R. Atkinson. 1994. "White Racial Identity Models: A Critique and Alternative Proposal," *Counseling Psychology* 22: 129-46.
- Sears, David O. 1988. "Symbolic Racism," in *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, ed. Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmás A. Taylor, New York: Plenum Press, 53-84.
- Spielman, Lisa A., Felicia Pratto and John A. Bargh. 1988. "Automatic Affect: Are One's Moods, Attitudes, Evaluations, and Emotions Out of Control?" *American Behavioral Scientist*, 31(3): 296-311.

- Swain, Carol M. 2002. *The New White Nationalism in America*. Boston, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1982. "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Annual Review of Psychology* 33: 1-30.
- Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Ingroup Behavior," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, Chicago: Nelson Hall, 7-24.
- Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." in *Organizational Identity: A Reader*.
- Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. "When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self Monitoring," *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4): 1032-53.
- Virtanen, Simo V. and Leonie Huddy. 1998. "Old-Fashioned Racism and New Forms of Racial Prejudice," *The Journal of Politics*, 60(2): 311-32.
- Voss, D. Stephen and David Lublin. 2001. "Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections." *American Politics Research* 29: 141-82.
- Wong, Cara and Grace E. Cho. 2005. "Two-Headed Coins or Kandinskys: White Racial Identification." *Political Psychology* 26 (October): 699-720.
- Yinger, John. 1995. *Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Logistic Regression: Predicting the Vote for Barack Obama

Independent Variables	Coefficient	Std. Error	z	p-value (2 tail test)
<i>White Race Prejudice Factors</i>				
White Identity	-.640032	.3584558	-1.79	0.074
Black Anger	-2.800756	1.017235	-2.75	0.006
Black Racial Group Interest	-.5946824	.3102361	-1.92	0.055
High Racial Resentment	.7815486	1.027702	0.76	0.447
<i>White Race Liberal Factors</i>				
White Pride	3.008662	1.380514	2.18	0.029
Black Pride	-.2989491	1.214928	-0.25	0.806
White Anger	-.6279488	1.70059	-0.37	0.712
Low Racial Resentment (Racial Acceptance)	4.515499	2.746647	1.64	0.100
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Military Household	.6427996	.8676305	0.74	0.459
Union Member	-1.565542	1.362697	-1.15	0.251
Homeowner	-1.690726	1.188115	-1.42	0.155
Church Attendance	-.2349121	.315859	-0.74	0.457
Iraq Mistake	1.45661	.9712899	1.50	0.134
Pro Affirmative Action	.1138269	.2397351	0.47	0.635
Pro Carbon Tax	3.471541	1.622093	2.14	0.032
Bush Disapproval	-.0877775	.4768749	-0.18	0.854
Democratic ID	.2049987	.1710896	1.20	0.231
Liberal ID	.5946716	.3449862	1.72	0.085
Dem Feeling Difference	.125738	.0371541	3.38	0.001
Education	.3835973	.2402197	1.60	0.110
Married	-2.681238	1.273145	-2.11	0.035
Age	-.0414209	.0294693	-1.41	0.160
Female	-1.611459	1.051716	-1.53	0.125
Unemployed	-3.481397	1.542544	-2.26	0.024
Household Income	-.0663093	.1034916	-0.64	0.522

Degrees of freedom = 458. Pseudo R² = 0.9041.

1= vote for Obama, 0=vote for all other candidates

Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given Racial Group Interest




Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given White Identity




Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given Anger Toward Blacks




Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given White Pride




Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given Racial Acceptance




Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given the Belief Obama will Help Blacks Less than McCain





Figure 7. Predicted Probability of Voting for Barack Obama Given Racial Solidarity



APPENDIX

White identity, Black solidarity

“How strongly to do you identify with white people?” “How strongly do you identify with black people?” Very strongly, somewhat strongly, not very strongly, not at all strongly

Take the difference

Anger toward blacks

“When you think of black people, how angry do they make you feel?” Very angry, Somewhat angry, Not very angry, Not angry at all

Black racial group interest

“Should the government help blacks and minorities, or should blacks and minorities help themselves?” 1= Government should help blacks and minorities, 7=blacks and minorities should help themselves

Difference between respondents’ position for Obama on scale from McCain’s position

Racial resentment, Racial acceptance

“Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” “If blacks tried harder, they’d be just as well off as whites.”

Strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree

Alpha = .83

White pride

“When you think of white people, how proud do they make you feel?” Very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all

White anger

“When you think of white people, how angry do they make you feel?” Very angry,
somewhat angry, not very angry, not angry at all

Black pride

“When you think of black people, how proud do they make you feel?” Very proud,
somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all